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High technology interventions near the end of life exact a high 
cost both in human and oeonomic terms. Breatbtakiog advances 
in cardiology have helped to prolong lile and impmve its qorlity 
for many. For some, it has transformed the process of dying into 
a medical q ightmare. The “do evgthiq possible” attitude that 
prevailed duriug the past few decades is both inhsmaw and 
wastefid. In contra& in the new era of managed care with its focus 
00 profit, a well meaning physician may became suspect whenever 
he recommends against a medical ioterventiun that be dmns to be 
futlk. More than ever before, there is a pressing nevd to develop 
ratiod guidelines fur end of Me medical intenentions to ensum 
pm of patients’ best interest% protect the iotegrity of tbe 
doctor-pntient relatiooship and nfiw the duty of the medial 
establishment toward society at large. This mighty issue must not 
be relinquished tu medkal ethiists, health care ailirlms or the 
courts. It is the domain of physicians ad tbe publii at large. 
MadiLpIElilicg shoAd he defiued as a treatment unlikely to a&t 
tbe course of illness cr that wbii has failed to arhieve its desired 
Ascal-& taught that mcdicinc is for those who were healthy 
in tneir nature hut were suffering fr:jm a specific disease: he rid 
them of it.. . then or&red them IO live as usual . . for those. 
however, whose bodies were ahvays in a sbtc of inner sickness. 
he did not attempt to prcscrihe a regimen . . IO make their life 
a prolonged misery.. . medicine was not intended for them and 
they should not be treated even if they were richer than h:idas 
-Flato. RfpuMir 
Managed Care and the Question of Medical 
Futility-Who Decides? 
Contcmporaty wisdom has it that some form or other ot 
managed care will dominate the health care “market” in the 
foreseeable future (l-3). Cost cutting is managed care’s relent- 
less focus and limiting treatment options its organizing princi- 
ple. Economic data show that 10% of all health care expendi- 
tures is spent during the last year of life. and a significant 
proportion of these expenditures is wasted on medical care 
that is deemed futile or of marginal utility (4-6)--a desirable 
prey for c&t cutting. 
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efects. Rational guidelinec for cardiopulmonap rebuscitation and 
do nol resuscitate orders should he formulated for both in- 
hospital and out of hospital victims of enrdiac at-ml. These 
guidelines need to be develuped tbmogh a pmcess similar to those 
fur the treatment of unstable angina, with involvement fmm all 
relevant medical specialities. Pmposed guidelines must be nego- 
tiated, mviewed and ratilkd by the lay public Appropriate 
legisl~tian is necessary to estabkh the hamewwrk and policies to 
cay out agreed on recommendatiows. Tbe focus of the %ing 
will” sbodd change so that it covers the last chapter of life rather 
tbro its terminal ph.~sc The document shoald seme to express tbe 
person’s wishes regardi 3g specilic medial iolcn-entions wbea the 
qualit! uf life is serksly diminished beyond w&at is uniquely 
desirable for the pa&Jar patient. Iking wills must be comprr- 
bensive. ckar and specific. They mast he honored. The L:nifona 
Health Decisions Act, nm pending kgislatiow. should enhasec the 
utility of the living will. 
(1 Am Cdl Cat&l 1996;28:16?3--30) 
Even though the foregoing argument ma! appear to be a 
lo@cal conclusion. the concept of futility remains extremely 
complex (7.8). Ethicists hate claimed thtq question 10 bc in 
their domain. But there is precious little conwnsua among 
leading ethicists regarding what constitutes medical futility. 
Similarly. cases that were brought for court review because of 
end of life treatment disputes were ruled on the hasis of unique 
technicalities in a case hy case hasis. Therefore. court rulings 
were often discordant. conflicting. confusing or incomplete (9). 
Similarly. despite repeated warnings from economists that the 
economy cannot sustain the present high technology-drive3 
wasteful termin; care. politicians are attempting IO tackle this 
problem through a hackdoor approach b which they have 
relinquished the whole issue to “market forces” (10-17). 
Should an issue as grave and complex as the care of the dying 
be left to a heartless business machine whose preoccupation is 
solely the bottom line? 
In many European countries, particularly Scandinavia. cuh- 
stantial savings have heen realized by reducing the pcrccNage 
of patients dying in hospitals to close to -SO5 ( 18). Contrast this 
with an 8lFi estimate in the United States. In this article, we 
will review the complex and often vexing aspee of high 
technology interventions near the en$l of life. WC will propox. 
f&the sake of debate. a formula for dealing with it. 
The ant of dying in the United States is enormous. For the 
6% or so of Medicare recipients who die each year. -SIT ; of the 
total cost of health care is spent during the last 6 months of life. 
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tially 30%.of total Medical expenditures cover the last month 
of life (4-6). Not surprisingly, Victor Fuchs. one of America’s 
leading health ‘care economists predicted that ‘one of the 
biggest challenges, facing policy makers for the next century 
will be how to strike an appropriate balance between care for 
the dyi;g and health services for the rest of the population” 
(12). However. another leading authority, argues that end of 
life expenditures are not growing disproportionately and that 
cost savings due to changes in practice at the end of life are not 
likely to be substantial (13). These estimates were derived 
mostly from treatment of terminally ill cancer patients. They 
do not take into account potential savings if more dying 
patients are cared for at home rather than in a hospital setting. 
In the discipline of cardiology, the past three decades have 
witnessed technologic advances in diagnosis and treatment 
deemed inconceivable to earlier specialists; open heart sur- 
gery, cardiopulmonary resuscitation. life-sustaining devices, 
implantable cardioverter-defibrillator. cardiac pacing, sophis- 
ticated means of cardiac imaging. interventional cardiology 
and therapeutic modalities for hypertension, angina, heart 
failure and hyperlipidemia. According to one estimate, a good 
80% of technologic advances apply to people past their fifth 
decade (16-17). These technologic advances have brought 
longer and healthier lives for many. At the same time. for 
some, they have enabled the sustenance of life beyond its 
reasonable limits; hoards of individuals are sustained in totally 
disabled bodies or in an unconscious or mindless state at an 
enormous cost to individuals, families and society (19,20). 
These unfortunate outcomes result from the new standard of 
medical care, which tests the endurance limits of various organs 
until the inevitable end. The fee for service system that compen- 
sates phpicians for expensive interventions has been blamed for 
much of the waste. Unreal&c patient and family demands fear of 
litigation and a passion for technology no doubt have contributed 
to the explosion of health care costs. Regardless of the reasons 
the pace of technologic advances has exceeded society’s ability to 
regulate its use at all levels of care, particularly with regard to 
terminally ill patients, a pace that can no longer be sustained. But 
where should the practicing cardiologist look for the much 
needed guidance in negotiating the difficulties of medical care 
when life has approached its close? 
Conflicting Signals From Medical Ethicisls 
Foremost among the difficulties attended in the care of a 
dying patient is that the definition of death has changed: 
Before 1360, death occurred with the cessation of flow of vital 
fluids, as with cardiac or respiratory arrest, or both. The wide 
application of cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the early 196& 
rendered obsolete the old definition of death; cardiopulmo- 
nary arrest has become a treatable condition (21-23). In the 
search for a new .definition of death, debate focused on 
whether the whole-brain (including brain stem) death or 
higher brain death (with permanent lo* of consciousness and 
cognition) definition should be adopted. The Harvard report 
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of 1969 (24) supported the. whole-brain standard, and ,this., 
definition was adopted by the President’s Commission for the 
Study .of Ethical Piotilems in Medicine and Biomedical and.’ 
Behavioral Research in 1981 (25). The Commission further 
advised that all U.S. courts adopt this new definition to guide’ 
legal conflicts resolution. 11;;: cm. ~, rwlv “/‘ye+ whnlc4& 
definition of death left the medical community with a large 
number of patients who have irretrievably lost upper brain 
function after cardiopulmonary resuscitation, multiple brain 
infarcts or extensive head injury but who are alive by virtue of 
persistent vegetative brain stem functions and with the aid of 
artificial nutrition and assisted ventilaticn. These unfortunates 
are legally alive ani are entitled to the right to be protected 
even though they have lost all ability to reject their fate. Of 
note is that the whole-brain definition has been challenged 
recently on philosophic and biologic grounds in favor of a 
higher brain definition (26-28). This issue is far from being 
settled, however, and the debate is expected to escalate in the 
future. 
The matter of medical futility is made even more difficult by 
the lack of consensus among leading medical ethicists (29-35). 
Wide differences of opinion still exist concerning the contro- 
versial subject of how to define futility of medical treatment. 
Futility is defined by some as care that has failed at least 100 
consecutive times previously (29). Others advise that useless 
medical care should not be withheld until other mitigating 
circumstances have been satisfied (34). Some experts go so far 
as to claim that the principle of autonomy and appeal to justice 
entitles a dying person to forms of treatment that may be 
deemed inappropriate on scientific medical grounds (33). 
Others claim that physicians cannot and must not be allowed to 
make the determination about medical futility (32). Yet some 
ethicists go as far as accusing the medical community for not 
doing enough interventions near the end of life (31-36). On 
the other extreme, leading authorities, such as Callahan of the 
Hasting’s Institute, feel strongly that age itself should be 
considered in the application of high technology interventions, 
claiming, as an example, that aortocoronary bypass surgery is 
not suitable for patients >70 years old (31,37). 
Similarly, the decision not to resuscitate has been shrouded 
b:: confusion and littered by contradicting medical. ethical and 
!cgal pronouncements (38). In the early 197Os, the medical 
establishment was engaged in an effort to define the indica- 
tions for cardiopulmonary resuscitation, dealing with the prob 
lem from a prerogative therapeutic point of view (39). These 
efforts were preempted in 1976, when the Massachusetts 
General Hospital medical ethics committee published its rec- 
ommendations about do not resuscitate (DNR) orders in the 
/ New England Jounial of Medicine (40). The proposed set of 
recommendations took DNR away from the realm of whether 
;,’ resuscitation is deemed appropriate on medical grounds. In- 
stead, resuscitation became established as the proper medical 
approach for all patients (implied consent) unless otherwise 
clearly articulated by the treating physician after appropriate 
consultation with other physicians not involved in the care of 
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the patient .and only with the consent of the .patient (if 
competent) as WC-I! as all relevant family members. 
Many hospitals have since developed. their own DNR 
guidelines (41). However, it present there is no consistent, 
universal policy guiding the rational selective application of 
DNR despite several recent outcome research data of in- 
hospital and out of hospitdl resuscitation (42-50). Further- 
more. studies showed that when appropriately informed about 
the outcome of resuscitation. time majority of elderly patients 
opt for DNR orders (46). not so when they are not fully 
informed about the poaible outcome of resuscitation. Ratio- 
nal universal resuscitation guidelines that take into account 
recent scientific data about resuscitation outcomes and the 
prevailing attitudes of well informed citizens are sorely needed. 
The Courts and End of Life Issues 
Conflicting. contradictory, incomplete and occasionally 
confusing best describe vari=az coart decisions regarding end 
of life issues. Guided (or misguided) by a whole-brain defini- 
tion of death limited to the cessation of brain stem function, as 
well as lack of uniformity in state laws and influenced by 
specific sets of circumstances, the courts have handed down 
decisions based on very narrow interpretations of the law. For 
example, on the one hand, the court upheld the mother’s 
request to discontinue artificial life support from the comatose 
Ann Quinlan: In so doing, the New Jersey Court supported the 
mother’s request as a substitute (substituted judgment stan- 
dard) of th. comatose patient (51). On the other hand, the 
U.S. Supreme Court denied a similar request from the parents 
of Nancy Cruzan of Missouri on the basis that the State of 
Missouri requires the more stringent “clear and convincing 
evidence,” which demands unequivocal proof that the parent’s 
request to terminate nutrition and hydration conformed to the 
patient’s own wishes (52). Also. whereas one court ruled to 
withhold a potentially curative treatment for leukemia from an 
institutionalized. mentally retarded Joseph Saikewicz on the 
basis that the treatment might impose unnecessary inconve- 
nience on the patient (53). another court ruled to continue 
ventilator support of an %-year old, permanently comatose 
Helga Wanglie of Minnesota against physician advice (37). In 
another case, one court ruled to uphold DNR orders for the 
senile Shirley Dennerstein, whq had generalized atherosclero- 
sis with multiple myocardial and cerebral infarctions (54). 
whereas another court denied a DNR order for a Georgia child 
with extensive degenerative central nervous system disorder 
and uncontrollable epilepsy, even though one of the parents 
agreed with the treating physician that the child’s condition 
was hopeless (55). In each case, the court ruled against the 
advice of the treating phpician. 
The ultimate in ambiguity is exemplified by the court 
decision regarding the anencephalie Baby K of Fairfti Vir-‘ 
ginia (56). Based on the testimony from one of the leading U.S. 
exp&ts in theoretical medical ethics. the court ruled that 
anencephaly is a quality of life issue related to one form of 
medical disability that is protected by the “Americans with 
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Disabilities Act” and that maintaining an anacephalic child on 
a ventilator should not be construed as:futiie care. Babv K. has 
beep maintained in a “never to become.conscious state” fbr ‘>2 
years. In another pe$eiring case. ihe Ndw York Court ruled 
against letting a terminally ill patient with aciuired immune’ 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS) die of pneumonia despite the 
patient’s expressed wishes (“living will”). The Court deemed 
that although AIDS was terminal and irreversible, pneumonia 
is a reversible condition that must therefore be treated (57). 
The Limited Utility of “Living Will” and 
Patient Self-Determination Act 
The Euthanasia Society of America was founded in the 
1960s in response to the public’s disdain for the idea that 
en;!avemcnt by high technology of permanently disabled bod- 
ies. often without a mind. is a life worth living. The “living will” 
was the brainchild of the founder of the society. intended to 
preserve one’s dignity when death is near and inevitable (58). 
The pioneer living will. F;roposed in 1%9, stated “if the 
situation should arise in which there is no reasonable expec- 
tation of my recovery from physical or mental disability, I 
request that I be allowed to die.” This original living will 
ducurnttrrt, .lored for its brevity and simplicity. was adopted by 
many citizens. Unfortunately the document lacked specificity 
and was deemed to be too ambiguous by lawyers, physicians 
and ethicists and was soon replaced by the more “legally 
correct” documents of today. After the California natural 
death act of 1976, other states adopted similar legislation 
allowing citizens to execute advance directives to guide medi- 
cal treatment near the end of life (59). More recent advance 
directive legislation in many states provides for the appoint- 
ment of a surrogate with a durable power of attorney for 
medical care decisions in the case of incompetence or disability 
(60,61). At preseut. all states have one form or another of 
advance directive legislation and >30 states have proxy stat- 
utes (62). 
Advance directives in their present form suffer from serious 
shortcomings. Generally. these are legal documents drafted by 
lawyers for interpretation by the courts. The documents are 
impersonal, written in legal jargon and often intimidating to 
the average citizen. Also. typically, “legally correct” forms of 
the living will apply only in extremis. when treatment is 
deemed futile and death is imminent (generally interpreted as 
death expected to occur in 2 weeks, with or without treatment). 
Living wills are not entirely binding to’the medical profession. 
and surrogate decisions should be adopted only if they am- 
form to the best judgment of the treating physician (63). 
Surrogate decisions are often tainted ly feelings of guilt. love. 
fear of loss or self-gain (64). Also, living wills are often 
neglected,(or noi found) at the time of need. No wonder that 
recent reports have &nvn that the living will in its present 
form is virtually useless in guiding ear&pulmonary resuscita- 
tion and other interventions near the end of life (65.6$). 
In a mobii society such as the United States, lack of 
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uniformity and portability of advance, directives from state to 
staie has proved an impediment to the iGty of, the living will 
as a guide to the withholding or withdrawing of treatmeni near 
the end of life. Similarly, the Paii&t Self-Determination Act 
(PSDA) legislation was enacted in 1990 by the U.S: Congress 
in an attempt to curb unwanted high technology interventions 
for the terminally ill by advising patients about their right to 
refuse treatment and of the consequences of planned interven- 
tions at the time of hospital admission (67). Not unexpectedly, 
PSDA legislation had little or no demonstrable effect on the 
utilization of high technology procedures before death (68). 
Evolving Trends 
Notwithstanding the present discourse, several areas of 
agreement seem to be evolving among ethicists and legal 
scholars (69j. For example, a consensus is developing that 
considers artificial nutrition and hydration equivalent to other 
medical interventions (70,71). Also, there is general agreement 
tha! there are no ethical grounds for differentiating between 
the withholding or withdrawal of treatment once medical 
futility is established and that physicians are under no obliga- 
tion to provide treatment that is deemed futile by reasonable 
medical standards (72-74). It must be emphasized that issues 
of feeding and hydration and the withdrawal of medical 
interventions are still problematic for some ethnic groups 
because of religious or cultural imperatives (75,76). Further- 
more, there has been an increasing trend, in more recent court 
rulings (far from unanimous), for courts to apply the “patient’s 
best interest” standard to guide medical treatment in an 
incompetent or unconscious patient (69-74). This standard is 
much less stringent than the subject+.z standard requiring 
“clear and convincing evidence.” More important, although 
infrequently emphasized, no physician has ever been indicted, 
let alone convicted, for withholding or withdrawing from a 
terminally ill patient a medical treatment that is deemed 
useless by rational competent medical standards (72). On the 
contrary, courts have repeatedly advised that complex medical 
decisions related to terminal illness are matters for the medical 
establishment (and not for the courts) to resolve in accordance 
with established medical protocols (51,54,73,74). Recent rec- 
ommendations from the American and British Medical Asso- 
ciations regarding persistent vegetative state are in harmcny 
with this trend (77,78). Also, the recent passage of the Uniform 
Health Care Decisions Act (approved by the Uniform Law 
Commissioners in August 1993 and approved by the American 
Bar Association in February 1994) should enable the replace- 
ment of current living wills statutes by a single statute that 
applies to all American states (79). The w&riding objective of 
the new act is to faciZtatz the use of advance directives and to 
make the patient’s wishes binding to physicians. 
Most important, the rapid expansion of medi,cal knowledge 
about outcomes of varioti interventions has provided cardiol- 
ogists with a great deal of information about the role of various 
diagnostic interventions and treatment modalities in the man- 
agement of patients with cardiac disease (80,81). More and 
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more the choice of a diagnostic procedure or a specific 
treatment depends on hard, data rather than thd cardiologist’s 
personal preference. The decade of the l’&JOs may prove ‘to be 
the decade when the once uvlimited enthusiasm about high 
technology that characterized the 198oS’is tempered by out- 
come data ‘gained from experience that have spanned several 
years and hundreds of thousands of procedures. 
Several attempts have been undertaken to establish priori- 
ties for high technology treatment in an intensive care envi- 
ronment. The Brookings Institute Report (82) on rationing of 
intensive care is but one serious rational approach to the 
problem. A computer-assisted program was developed and 
subsequently refined utilizing th- Glasgow APACHE SCALE 
to consider acute physiologic and chronic health states (83). 
Similarly, the Ryjadh Intensive Care Program (RICP), devel- 
oped in England, was touted by many as reliable in predicting 
futility in the intensive care unit but criticized by some; the 
program has a margin of error of 5%, which would not be 
acceptable by conventional U.S. standards of care (84). Crite- 
ria for priority of intensive and terminal health care continue 
to evolve slowly (85). The Oregon model of state-supported 
health care is a notable example (86). In the Oregon Medicaid 
model, health care priorities are set based on 800 disorders. 
Pneumonia, tuberculosis, peritonitis, appendicitis and hernia 
with obstruction topped the list. Kidney cysts, terminal AIDS, 
chronic pancreatitis and extremely low birth weight earned the 
lowest priority. These priorities were established after exten- 
sive open public debate. Hospice care has replaced high 
technology care for many categories of terminal illness and 
end-stage disease in the Oregon model. 
Managed Care-the Solution? 
Today’s cardiologists find themselves caught in a dilemma: 
On tt-e one hand, advances in scientific knowledge and tech- 
nology enable them to perform or advocate improved outcome 
procedures to sicker and older patients (87-90). On the other 
hand, new pressures to limit the number of costly procedures 
are imposed on physicians from a managed care environment 
(91,92). Although the premise of managed care is predicated 
solely on cost containment, administrators of managed care 
have skillfully relinquished decisions regarding medical care 
guidelines to health care professionals. At the same time, they 
have deliberately placed the physicians’ economic interests at 
odds with expensive care. To put it bluntly, the fewer proce- 
dures the doctor performs, the more the company profits and 
the bigger the doctor’s share in these profits. This trend 
Tepresents a 180” shift from the fee for service paradigm of 
yesteryear. Whether the main driving force to do more for 
patienJs,was due to altruistic mot&s or physician self-interest 
did vat seem ‘to matter; these two. powerful forces were in, 
concordance. In the new environment, the altruistic compo- 
nent of medicine, by which the physician hewed himself or 
herself as the patient’s advocate regardless of cost, will no 
doubt be sacrificed at the altar of costeffectiveness, which, 
masquerading as pruderice, places the treating cardiologist’s 
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financial interests at odds with the patient’s health needs: The 
inevitable consequence will,no doubt lead to the temptation to 
sacrifice the patient’s best interests-a very disturbing propo- 
sition. Although the majority of cardiologists are expected to 
adhere to the highest standards of honesty ‘and professional 
integrity, the fraudulent few will render the most well meaning 
physician suspect when he or she recommends against inter- 
vention, even though it has been deemed to be medically futile. 
Is There a More Rational Solution? 
Issues related to death, permanent infirmity, hopeless de- 
pendence and indignity are riddled with religious, cultural, 
ethnic, racial and economic complexities and charged with a 
multitude of emotions and passions that go beyond the realm 
of organ-specific medical practice, such as cardiology. We 
proposed a three-pronged approach to dealing with issues of 
use of high technology near the end of life: 
the development of professional practice guidelines for 
limiting or withholding treatment, including cardiopulmo- 
nary resuscitation; 
a lay public commission to study. make recommendations, 
disseminate information and allocate priorities in the man- 
agement of patients with end-stage disease; and 
a legislative process that transforms public sentiments into 
public policies. 
The recently developed clinical practice guidelines on unstable 
angina by the Agency for Health Care Policy (AHCPR) and 
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) is a model 
for emerging clinical practice guidelines (93). However, in the 
case of end of life issues, not only organ-specific specialty 
organizations (brain, heart, lung, kidney), but also other spe- 
cialities (infectious disease, oncology, geriatric medicine, 
emergency room specialists, intensivists and primary medical 
and surgical specialities) should be involved. It may seem an 
impossible task to assemble representatives from all these 
disciplines to r-view all relevant literature and develop univer- 
sally applicable practice guidelines; however, the task is worth 
the effort. Review by the public is absolutely essential for these 
guidelines to become widely applicable as welI as acceptable to 
patients and potential patients. Lessons can be learned from 
many western countries that have established committees to 
review and guide the adoption and implementation of 
community-accepted standards of care near the end of life. 
The Danish Council on Ethics is such a model (94). Estab- 
lished in 1988 to guide the Danish Parliament in sorting out the 
difficult ethical and legal issues attendent on terminal care and 
other health care dilemmas, the CounciI is more ‘grass roots 
than any other committee in the world It is composed of 17 
members with neafly equal male’ and female representation. 
The Council’s public education efforts are far reaching and 
encompass a wide range of ethical issues dealing with public 
health. For example, it is this Council that recommended that 
irreverstble cessation of higher brain function be reviewed as 
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the end of life. The Council also oversees public education in 
health-related and end of life care issues. including television 
debates and the production of health education materials for 
schoolchildren and the public: Guided by public opinion polls. 
televized medical discussions, and open debates, the ‘Council 
recommends new health-related legislation to the Danish 
Parliament (95). In the United States, the Oregon model for 
established health priorities can be viewed as the brainchild of 
a deliberaiive rational public process, leading to reasonable 
political action. Likewise, few health maintenance organiza- 
tions have allowed meaningful public involvement in establish- 
ing health care strategies. Group Health Cooperative of Puget 
Sound in Seattle. Washington, is one notable example (%). 
The time has come for a national commission, properly 
selected from community leaders. to be empowered to develop 
goals and procedures for treatment near the end of life. Let it 
be named the Quinlan Commission in honor of Karen Ann 
Quinlan, whose mother was the first to challenge the high 
technology maintenance of unconscious existence. The Com- 
mission should be relatively independent and broadly repre- 
sentative but should not be seen as representative of any 
particular special interest group. Members should be ap- 
pointed in a manner similar to that for Justices of the Supreme 
Court. The Commission must be insulated from political 
pressure or interference by lobbyists. It may work tvith small 
groups that interact within medical authorities, legat scholars, 
ethics specialists, economists, theologians representing domi- 
nant religions and scientists. The Commission will have access 
to opinion polls, health statistics and other pertinent informa- 
tion. The Commission should develop substitute judgment 
standards for care of the incompetent and the terminally ill. 
The Commission should be charged with the duty to recom- 
mend, review and modify health care legislation and establish 
priorities for medical care. including home and hospice care. In 
addition, the Commission should establish strategies and de- 
velop instructional materials for dissemination of information 
and cdacation of the public at large. The Commission is 
r...pected to propose laws necessary to ensure uniformity, 
access and portability of advance directives as well as provide 
the guarantees that the patient’s expressed wishes are carried 
out. 
Advance directive legislation deserves total overhauling. 
The focus of the living will should not be to prevent unneces- 
sary treatment in extremis when death is imminent and un- 
avoidable; rather. the living will should serve to express the 
individual’s own wishes in planning medical decisions for the 
last chapter of life. The living will should address treatment 
options (including cardiilmonary resuscitation) when the 
patient becomes incompetent or incapable of making such 
decisions because of severe dementia; crippling stroke; end- 
stage organ failure: disseminated, unresponsive cancer; and 
advanced resistant infection. including AIDS. 
,Under these circumstances, many indiiduals may choose 
not to interfere in the process of dying. Their values and beliefs 
lead them to prefer, death to a much diminished life. One of us 
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(L.B.) ha:: composed a simplified. living will and a workbook 
covering various medical scenarios common to the,last chapter 
of life (97). The document is written in plain English void of 
legal jargon. Individuals are encouraged to discuss treatment 
options under these specific scenarios with their family. physi- 
cii.os and would-be surrogates. This or a similar document 
should be adopted for universal USC. 
What makes this proposal even more timely is the pending 
Uniform Health Decisions Act. This legislation was proposed 
by the Uniform Law Commissioners in August 1093 and was 
ratitied by the American Bar Association in February 1994. 
The legislation should enhance the utility, portability and 
relevance of the living will by making advance directive legis- 
lation uniform among all American states. 
A central registry should be established to enable physicians 
and paraprofessional personnel immediate access to the latest 
patient-expressed wishes. Also. legislation is needed that re- 
quires treating physicians to honor the spirit of patient’s 
directives. Only then can we expect the living will to fulfill the 
patient’s wishes when life approaches its close (98). 
Conclusions 
As health care delivery in America is transformed from a 
fee for service to a managed care formula, cost-conscious 
guidelines for care are inevitable. Futile medical care admin- 
istered to hopelessly i!l patients accounts for an annual total 
waste of $30 billion by conservative estimates and for as much 
as $108 billion by others. Nowhere is the heavy hand of 
managed care likely to be felt as in the application of high 
technology medicine near the end of life. 
Whereas advances in medical technology have enabled 
cardiologists to extend complex interventional and surgical 
services to older and sicker patients at acceptable mortality 
and morbidity rates, the managed care environment. motivated 
solely by financial profit, will limit imerventions deemed of 
marginal utility. The appetite for cutting medical costs, if 
unchecked, promises at best to stifle medical progress by 
curbing the application of new technologies and at worst to 
corrupt some members of the medical profession into limiting 
patient care to further their own financial interests. The danger 
of unilaterally rationing medical care near the end of life, if 
unregulated and well monitored, could prove extremely costly 
both to society and to the medical establishment by undermin- 
ing the trust placed by patients in their treating physicians. 
As difficult as it may seem, and despite obvious complexities 
and ambiguities! practice guidelines, dealing with end-stage 
disease and medical treatment of the terminally ill patient is 
vital if we are to maintain a standard of care that is rational, 
redeeming and worthwhile. The example set forth in establish- 
ing guidelines for the treatment of unstable angina should be 
the reference standard for all other emerging guidelines of 
medical care. 
The medica! profession and U.S. Courts badly need guid- 
ance in how to deal with complex, emotionally charged, 
controversial issues near the end of life, such as in the cases of 
the $1 million. ill-fated surgery for the Lakersburg Siamese 
twins: the anenccphalic Baby K maintained by assisted venti- 
lation for >2 years; and the 86year old persistently comatose 
Helga Wanglie maintained on assisted ventilation. Who will 
decide the fate of similar patients in a managed care environ- 
ment’! Will the physician act in the best interests of the big 
company whose only motive is prom. only to find himself or 
herself at the mercy of the law, facing the consequences of his 
actions? The medical establishment cannot afford to endorse 
such an arrangement. which is Fair neither to patient nor 
doctor. In the present article, we propow a mechanism by 
which guidelines for medical futility and application of cardio- 
pulmonary resuscitation are developed by the medical estab- 
lishment, negotiated with the public and transformed into 
public policy. Suggestions to enhance the utility and relevance 
of the living will are provided. 
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